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The investigation of the determinants of economic growth plays an important role for 
our understanding of the sources of cross-country income differences. This paper analyzes 
the effects of institutions and innovations on country productivity growth. The empirical 
evidence shows that institutions and innovations matter, in particular for human capital 
efficiency. Without controlling for endogeneity the effect of innovations turns significant 
only when aggregate institutions indexes or human capital efficiency are included. 
When controlling for endogeneity innovations become insignificant, but more institutional 
variables become relevant. Under robustness checks innovations indeed have a direct 
effect on country productivity growth moderated by a country’s human capital efficiency. 
Allowing for three alternative institutional variables does not change the effects of the 
institutional variables of interest. 
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1. Introduction 
The investigation of the determinants of economic growth plays an important role for our 
understanding of the sources of today’s cross-country income differences. It helps us to ex-
amine why some countries have grown much more rapidly over the past decades while others 
have not. This becomes even more significant with regard to the divergence in growth rates 
between European countries and the US before the current financial crisis. 
Part of the subsequent analysis will be on the contributions of physical capital, labor, 
and technological change to growth in the production possibility frontier of countries. Be-
cause of various studies technological progress has gained importance in our understanding 
of cross-country and over-time differences in economic performance (Barro, 1991; Nelson 
and Phelps, 1966; Hall and Jones, 1999; Caselli and Coleman, 2001, 2006). Over the last 
decades, major innovations and the employment of new technologies facilitated shifts in the 
production possibility frontier of nations leading them to higher living standards. It is the 
combination of increased efficiency in the production process, the development of new prod-
ucts, the availability of skilled workers to employ new technologies, and the expected gains 
derived from profitable investments that encourage firms to invest in innovations, and that 
ultimately boost productivity growth and long-term living standards. 
Regarding the tremendous productivity increases of the US economy post 1995, par-
ticularly generated in high-tech sectors, sectoral productivity gains are expected to emanate 
from innovation activities. During the emergence of the New Economy in the mid–1990s, the 
employment of new IT equipment, especially in the ICT-producing industries (semiconduc-
tors, computers, and telecommunications) spurred US economic growth dramatically. But 
also higher ICT investments in other sectors that intensively used these new technologies 
enabled the generation of higher productivity gains. The utilization of both ICT and research 
and development (R&D) apparently provides a symbiotic relationship catalyzing productivity 
growth, branding ICT a general purpose technology (GPT). Such GPT triggers complemen-
tary innovations and R&D expenditures in other sectors (Bresnahan and Trajtenberg, 1995; 
Helpman and Trajtenberg, 1998a, b). 
Modeling the interaction effect of ICT and innovations rests upon economic mecha-
nisms postulated by models of endogenous rather than neoclassical growth, since standard 
neoclassical growth models abstain from assigning an explicit role to innovations. While 
neoclassical models are primarily based on the work of Solow (1956, 1957), the branch of   2
endogenous growth models has originated by Romer (1986, 1990), and followed by Arrow 
(1962), Coe and Helpman (1995), Grossmann and Helpman (1991), and Aghion and Howitt 
(1992, 1998). Those endogenous growth models became of increasing importance as they no 
longer assume technological progress to be exogenously given, but rather endogenously de-
termined through entrepreneurs’ profit maximization behavior subject to their investment 
decision. 
However, the endogenous growth literature also establishes that reward structures faced 
by firms and individuals play a central role in shaping whether individuals undertake the in-
vestments in new technology and in human capital necessary for economic growth. These 
reward structures are determined by policies and institutions, and provide the fundamentals to 
the understanding of the growth process over time as well as across countries. However, po-
litical institutions themselves are not exogenously given per se, but change along the equilib-
rium path as a result of their own dynamics and stimuli stemming from changes in technol-
ogy, trading opportunities, and factor endowments. 
Since this study seeks to investigate the fundamental causes of cross-country productiv-
ity differentials, I additionally – besides standard neo-classical and New Growth theory – 
consider the institutional hypothesis (Acemoglu, 2009) suggesting that it is the rules, regula-
tions, laws, contracts, and policies that affect economic incentives and thus the incentives to 
invest in technology, physical and human capital (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2001, 
2002, 2005a, b): 
“...the factors we have listed (innovation, economies of scale, 
education, capital accumulation etc.) are not causes of growth; 
they are growth.” (North and Thomas, 1973, p. 2) 
As outlined by Acemoglu (2009), contrary to potential growth determinants such as geogra-
phy and culture, a society collectively can decide to change its institutions so as to achieve 
better economic outcomes, rendering institutions highly endogenous. It is the direct control 
that the members of the society exert that shapes institutions and that demarcates institutional 
from cultural effects. 
The policy relevance of studying institutions is in understanding their effects on growth 
and in determining which specific types of institutions matter. One therefore may expect na-
tions endowed with economic institutions, that facilitate and encourage factor accumulation, 
innovation, and the efficient allocation of resources to prosper compared to nations that do 
not dispose of such institutions.   3
In this paper I analyze the effects of institutions and innovations on country productiv-
ity. In my first attempt without controlling for endogeneity I find that aggregate institutions 
matter, in particular, basic institutional quality and human capital efficiency. The effect of 
innovations turns statistically significant only when aggregate institutions or basic institu-
tional quality and human capital efficiency are accounted for. ICT and Non-ICT capital deep-
ening matters throughout all specifications. When controlling for endogeneity the results are 
that ICT capital deepening loses significance, except when human capital efficiency is in-
cluded. Also, innovations become insignificant throughout all specifications, but more insti-
tutional variables are estimated as statistically significant. 
Controlling for correlation between institutional covariates leaves a parsimonious 
benchmark model including three institutional variables: human capital efficiency, labor 
markets, and capital markets. Empirical evidence further shows that innovations have a direct 
effect on country productivity growth and that this effect is moderated by a country’s human 
capital efficiency. Allowing for three alternative institutional variables does not change the 
effects of the institutional variables of interest. Ultimately, ICT capital deepening becomes 
significant in the parsimonious benchmark model as well as in the other robustness check 
specifications. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 explains the data employed to construct out-
put, input, innovation, and institutional variables. For the latter, the sub-components of the 
employed DICE Institutions Climate Index (Eicher and Roehn, 2007) are explained in detail. 
Section 3 presents the estimation strategy of determining the effects of standard neoclassical 
factors, innovations, and institutions on country productivity growth. In addition, I present a 
robustness analysis applying correlation and sensitivity tests to the basic results, while section 
4 provides concluding remarks. 
2. Data 
2.1  Output, Input, and R&D Stocks 
The analysis focuses on the effects of innovations and institutions on labor productivity 
growth of 10 selected OECD countries covering the period 1992–2005.
1 I commence by em-
ploying a standard neoclassical production function with output and input factors motivated 
by the Solow (1956) growth model. The input factors are capital and labor, where capital is 
                                                           
1 The countries in the panel are Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, United 
Kingdom, and the United States.    4
measured as capital services and labor as total hours worked by persons engaged; output is 
value-added. Output and input factors for Germany are provided by the Ifo Industry Growth 
Accounting Database (henceforth IIGAD)
2, while international data on output and inputs are 
obtained from the EUKLEMS Growth and Productivity Accounts (henceforth EUKLEMS).
3 
Since our period of analysis coincides with the launching phase of the New Economy during 
the second half of the 1990s, the data accounts for productivity effects stemming from infor-
mation and communication technology (ICT) by allowing capital services to differ in ICT and 
Non-ICT. 
Due to the sectoral nature of the data disaggregation into 13 goods-producing industries 
(for a detailed industry list see Table A1, Appendix) and accounting for industry-specific 
trends in new technologies underlying the employed investments become available. This is 
illustrative for the US and other industrialized countries, particularly for high-tech sectors as 
e.g. Office Machinery & Computers, as most countries’ productivity growth accelerated post 
1995. Jorgenson (2005), for example, argues that the magnitude of the US growth resurgence 
outpaced all but the most optimistic expectations. After advances in the productivity meas-
urement allowed for effective accounting of information technology in national statistics 
(Schreyer, 2001), it became clear that the recent productivity increases originated mainly with 
ICT investments. 
Going beyond the standard neoclassical assumptions of factor accumulation as the main 
source of country growth differentials, I turn to the “The New Growth Theory” (Romer, 
1990; Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Grossman and Helpman, 1991) that highlights the forces 
generating technological change within the economy to produce sustained long-term growth. 
The key insight is that sustained growth requires ever more efficient use of available re-
sources, and that this increase in efficiency is ultimately driven by industry R&D. Hence, the 
New Growth Theory outlines exactly how technological progress is driven by innovations 
undertaken by firms seeking to maintain their competitive market position. Firm R&D efforts 
prevent a decline of the marginal product of capital, as new technologies are embodied in 
capital services. 
Incorporating the implications of New Growth Theory, I try to capture innovation ef-
fects on country productivity growth by deriving an appropriate proxy for technological 
change, replacing the total factor productivity residual usually organically derived from 
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3 For a detailed description of the data, see Timmer et al. (2007a, b).   5
growth accounting exercises. Thereby I seek to account for the scale-effects critique by Jones 
(1995) and construct industry-level R&D stocks by country, using the OECD methodology 
outlined in Guellec and Pottelsberghe (2001). The employed R&D data is provided by the 
OECD STAN R&D Database (henceforth OECD).
4 
Since my main interest is on labor productivity growth, all output and input variables, 
as well as the R&D stocks are given in growth rates. For detailed descriptive statistics of 
these variables, see Table 1. 
2.2  Institutional Indexes  
Inspired by the emergence of endogenous growth theories, many empirical cross-country 
studies have extended the framework of Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) by adding regres-
sors determined outside of Solow’s (1956) neoclassical growth model. Besides innovations, I 
further account for institutional variables. Introducing institutions in the analysis seeks to 
determine how far institutions matter for country productivity growth and doing so tries to 
mitigate potential omitted variables biases on the country level. Instead of introducing coun-
try fixed effects, I will model the country effects explicitly by their underlying institutional 
settings. 
Following Mancur Olson in his book The Rise and Decline of Nations (Olson, 1982), 
the “sources of economic growth” haven been expressively demonstrated by Denison’s and 
Jorgenson’s sophisticated measurement approaches of the contributions of capital accumula-
tion and technology progress; but those estimations do not reveal the deeper underlying 
causes of growth. In particular, Olson argues that past research on the real causes of growth 
were lacking since they did not answer the fundamental question as to the primary establish-
ment of growth prospects; rather: 
“they trace the water in the river to the streams and lakes from 
which it comes, but they do not explain the rain” (Olson, 1982, 
p. 4). 
The institutional variables employed in this study are derived from the DICE Institu-
tions Climate Index developed by Eicher and Roehn (2007). The central purpose of the DICE 
index is to assess the extent to which individual OECD countries dispose of the institutional 
quality to achieve economic growth. Therefore the authors seek to identify a set of institu-
tional variables that can be robustly related to economic performance in OECD economies by 
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summarizing a country’s overall institutional performance in several distinct growth-relevant 
dimensions. The total index as well as its sub-components measure institutional quality with 
respect to the best-practice country, i.e. as the indexes ranges from 0 to 1 (assigning higher 
values to those institutions that are better for economic growth) the closer a country’s value is 
to 1, the better its institutional quality compared to the OECD leader. A key feature of the 
index is that all components of the indexes are selected and weighted based on their predic-
tive power. Each of the sub-components will be described in detail in the following.
5 
Optimal Taxation 
With 21.2 percent, Optimal Taxation carries the largest weight, due to its large statistical and 
economic contribution to the overall index. This sub-index assigns low values to countries 
with either insufficiently low or excessively high tax rates. The intuition is that taxes have a 
nonlinear effect on growth. A certain quantity of tax revenues is necessary for growth to pro-
vide, for example, productivity enhancing infrastructure investments. However, excessive tax 
rates deter private investment. This idea was first formalized in an endogenous growth 
framework by Barro (1990, 1991) and is incorporated in the index by including a tax wedge 
measure and a squared tax component. The index also comprises a top marginal tax rate, 
which assigns higher ratings to countries with lower marginal tax rates accounting for the 
effect at higher income thresholds (Fraser Institute, 2006).  
Basic Institutional Quality 
Another important sub-index is the Basic Institutional Quality with a weight of 21 percent. 
Basic Institutional Quality resembles the original index of government anti-diversion policies 
employed in Hall and Jones (1999). It measures the extent to which the government protects 
individuals from diverting resources into unproductive uses through, e.g. protection of prop-
erty rights, law and order enforcement, impartial courts or bureaucratic quality, or how the 
government themselves acts as a diverter, for example, through corruption. 
 The Basic Institutional Quality sub-index comprises 7 components. The first compo-
nent measures how political stability influences the climate of foreign investors. Another 
component captures the institutional strength that minimizes revisions of policy when gov-
ernments change (bureaucratic quality). Therefore, high points are given to countries where 
the bureaucracy has the strength and expertise to govern without drastic changes in policy or 
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interruptions in government services (ICRG, 2006). The component law and order assesses 
the strength and impartiality of the legal system and the observance of the law. Countries that 
enjoy a high law-and-order rating exhibit sound judicial systems and legal enforcement with 
effective sanctions (ICRG, 2006). The component property rights and legal structure contains 
valuations of judicial independence, impartial courts, protection of intellectual property, mili-
tary interference in rule of law and the political process, and the integrity of the legal system 
(Fraser Institute, 2006). A further component is the assessment of a country’s level of corrup-
tion. Finally, the last two components are survey questions of Ifo’s World Economic Survey 
(WES) about a country’s confidence in economic policy as well as about the extent to which 
the climate of foreign investors is influenced by a country’s legal/administrative restrictions 
for foreign firms to invest and/or to repatriate profits.  
Fiscal Burden 
The Fiscal Burden component contributes to the overall index with 16.7 percent. It measures 
the extent to which the government diverts resources away from private and possibly more 
productive use. A country’s fiscal burden is proxied by the total tax revenue as percentage of 
a country’s GDP. The component is a good measure of the extent of a country’s tax system. 
Direct taxes might be low, but the government might alternatively generate revenues from 
indirect taxes as well as from a host of alternative fees and hidden taxes. The revenue section 
is thus perhaps the best measure of the negative impact of the size of the government that has 
been highlighted by Barro (1990). 
Human Capital Efficiency 
The importance of human capital as a driver of economic growth has been acknowledged in 
economics at least since the influential papers of Lucas (1988) and Romer (1990). Human 
capital can either act as a factor of production in the technology sector (Romer, 1990) or it 
can facilitate the adoption of technology diffusion (Nelson and Phelps, 1966; Benhabib and 
Spiegel, 1994). The measure of Human Capital Efficiency receives a weight of 14.9 percent 
in the overall index. This sub-index is composed of the subsequent four components: tertiary 
gross enrolment ratio, average years of schooling, secondary gross enrolment ratio, and total 
public educational expenditure. Tertiary gross enrolment ratio is the number of pupils en-
rolled in tertiary education, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the population of 
the five-year age group following on from the secondary school leaving age. Average years 
of schooling of adults is the years of formal schooling received, on average, by adults over   8
age 15. Secondary gross enrolment ratio is the number of pupils enrolled in secondary, re-
gardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the population in the theoretical age group for 
secondary education. Finally, total public educational expenditure is measured as the current 
and capital expenditures on education by local, regional and national governments, including 
municipalities, expressed as a percentage of GDP. 
Trade Openness 
The positive impact of a country’s openness towards other countries on growth was empiri-
cally shown by Sachs and Warner (1995). Trade promoting policies do not only yield benefits 
from specialization and facilitate the adoption of technology from other countries, but as Hall 
and Jones (1999, p. 98) point out, provide “lucrative opportunities for private diversion”. 
Thus, Hall and Jones include a measure of openness in their index of institutional quality. 
The measure of the degree of Trade Openness employed here contains the following compo-
nents: tariffs, trade size, and black market premium. Tariffs contains information about the 
revenues from taxes on international trade as a percentage of exports plus imports, the mean 
tariff rate as well as the standard deviation of tariff rates (Fraser Institute, 2006). The compo-
nent trade size measures the actual size of the trade sector compared to expected size. It then 
allocates higher ratings to countries with large trade sectors compared to what would be ex-
pected, given their population, geographic size, and location. On the other hand, countries 
with small trade sectors relative to the expected size receive lower ratings (Fraser Institute, 
2006). The component black market premium assesses the difference between official ex-
change rate and black market rate. This component allocates the highest rating to countries 
without a black-market exchange rate, i.e. those with a domestic currency that is fully con-
vertible without restrictions. When exchange rate controls are present and a black market 
exists, the ratings will decline toward zero as the black market premium increases toward 50 
percent. The lowest rating is given when the black market premium is equal to, or greater 
than, 50 percent (Fraser Institute, 2006). 
Labor Markets 
Rigid labor markets or tight regulations might prevent an economy from reacting to techno-
logical changes and allocate labor to the most productive use and, hence, distort growth. Fur-
thermore, other institutional arrangements that affect the labor market such as the pension 
system, retirement age or family policy or child care can lead to the exclusion of whole 
groups of the population from the labor market and thereby from production. The compo-  9
nents of the Labor Markets variable are discussed as follows. An early retirement index is 
constructed as 1 minus the male labor force participation rate of age 55–64. A country re-
ceives a higher value the lower the early retirement index. Another index of labor market 
regulations combines information about the impact of minimum wage, hiring and firing prac-
tices, the share of the labor force whose wages are set by centralized collective bargaining, 
unemployment benefits and the use of conscripts to obtain military personnel (Fraser Insti-
tute, 2006). Finally, the female labor participation rate is also included. This component prox-
ies for the obstacles existing within a country that prevents women from actively participat-
ing in the labor market. 
Government Expenditures 
Next, it is assumed that output diverted to government expenditures captures the cost of gov-
ernment in a society. When a government expends money, it acquires resources, diverting 
them away from potentially more productive private choices of resource allocations (Fraser 
Institute, 2006). The variable Government Expenditures is measured as general government 
consumption spending as a percentage of total consumption as well as government enter-
prises and investment as a percentage of total investment. 
Capital Markets 
The beneficial effect of capital markets or financial intermediation on economic performance 
was found, e.g. in the seminal contribution of Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000). Financial 
intermediation is seen to help a) production of ex ante information about possible invest-
ments, b) monitoring of investments and implementation of corporate governance, c) trading, 
diversification, and management of risk, d) mobilization and pooling of savings, and e) ex-
change of goods and services.  
Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005) additionally stress the importance of finan-
cial intermediation for the rate of technology diffusion. The preferred proxy for financial in-
termediation is usually the ratio of private credit to GDP (see Levine, Loayza and Beck, 
2000; Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes, 2005; Levine 2005). The here employed measure 
of Capital Markets or financial intermediation is comprised of private sector domestic credit 
as a percentage of GDP and capital market controls. Private sector domestic credit refers to 
financial resources provided to the private sector, such as through loans, purchases of non-
equity securities, and trade credits and other accounts receivable that establish a claim for 
repayment (WDI, 2006). Capital market controls assesses the access of citizens to foreign   10
capital markets and foreign access to domestic capital markets as well as restrictions on the 
freedom of citizens to engage in capital market exchange with foreigners (Fraser Institute, 
2006). 
Since many institutional variables do not show strong variability over time, I will in-
corporate institutions in terms of levels in the growth regressions. The introduction of the 
initial levels of institutions is sought to capture the effect of conditional convergence in coun-
try productivity growth rates. For detailed descriptive statistics of the institutional variables, 
see Table 1. 
3. Econometric  Estimation 
3.1  Estimation Strategy 
Beginning the econometric strategy I implement a benchmark cross-country panel regression 
according to  
t , j , i t , j , i 3
NICT
t , j , i 2
ICT
t , j , i 1 t , j , i ε ln Δ R ln Δ β k ln Δ β k ln Δ β α y ln Δ + + + + =         (1) 
with yi,j,t representing labor productivity (measured as value-added per hour worked) of in-
dustry i in country j at time t, ki,j,t is capital deepening (measured as capital services per hour 
worked) separated for ICT and Non-ICT, and the stock of R&D, Ri,j,t. For the error term, εi,j,t, 
I assume time-variant industry and country effects, ai,t and bj,t, and a stochastic component, 
ei,j,t, being i.i.d: 
t , j , i t , j t , i t , j , i e ln Δ b ln Δ a ln Δ ε ln Δ + + = .          (2) 
Since labor productivity is in growth rates, all time-invariant effects are already purged from 
the regression. 
To directly examine the impact of institutions on productivity growth I specify the 
country effects of equation (2) to be determined by institutional variables Xm,j,t (institutions m 
= 1, …, M as listed in Table 1). Those institutions are invariant for all industries within coun-




t , j , m m t , j ν ln Δ X δ γ b ln Δ + ∑ + =
=
                   (3) 
with νj,t being i.i.d. As country productivity growth rates are assumed to be significantly de-
termined by input factors and innovations conditioned on established institutions, the DICE 
indexes enter growth regressions in levels.   11
To estimate the institutional effects in a one-step approach I insert equation (2) and (3) 
into equation (1): 
t , j , i
M
1 m
t , j , m m t , i t , j , i 3
NICT
t , j , i 2
ICT
t , j , i 1 t , j , i ξ ln Δ X δ a ln Δ R ln Δ β k ln Δ β k ln Δ β y ln Δ ∑ + + + + + =
=
 ,    (4) 
with ξi,j,t being i.i.d. 
As the specter of endogeneity looms large in this short panel and the i.i.d. assumption 
of ξi,j,t is unlikely to hold, particularly as changes along the transition path are expected to 
feedback into capital services, R&D and alterations in institutional settings, an implementa-
tion of GMM techniques (Roodman, 2005) for consistency of coefficient estimates becomes 
necessary. Since appropriate external instruments are not easily to obtain, I revert to lagged 
values of regressors as internal instruments. Due to higher efficiency in short panels the sys-
tem GMM constituted by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) is chosen 
over the first-difference GMM (Arellano and Bond, 1991). As the regressors are to some ex-
tent in growth rates I implement lags t-4 and deeper as valid instruments. Furthermore, to test 
how specific institutions prepare the ground for innovations and long-term productivity, 
growth interactions between Ri,j,t and Xm,j,t are included, as well as alternative institutional 
covariates for robustness checks. 
3.2  Time Series Analysis 
As a next step, I conduct panel time series analyses to check for panel stationarity and to en-
sure that problems of spurious correlations do not apply to the data. For panel unit-root tests 
the approaches of Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) and Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003), henceforth 
LLC and IPS, in case of balanced variables, and Fisher-type tests for augmented Dickey-
Fuller (1979) and Phillips-Perron (1988), henceforth ADF and PP, for unbalanced variables 
are employed. 
The panel unit-root tests (Table A4, Appendix) reject the assumption of panel non-
stationarity for output and input variables in growth rates; hence, their employment is unprob-
lematic.
6 Supported by the tests no sectoral growth trends underlie the data generating proc-
ess (DGP) signaling that no further differencing of variables is required. Regarding the insti-
tutional variables in levels one may expect them to exhibit strong unit roots, which is why I 
conduct panel unit-root tests on the residuals of the least-square dummy variable regressions 
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specifications the hypothesis of non-stationarity in the panel can be rejected on the highest level of significance 
throughout all test approaches.   12
in Table 2. A rejection of the hypothesis of non-stationarity in the residuals will indicate that 
the models are well specified. The results of the panel unit-root test on the residuals will be 
discussed in the following section. 
3.3  Estimation Results 
3.3.1  Basic Model Estimations 
Starting the empirical strategy I estimate equation (4) via a least-square dummy-variable 
(LSDV) approach. As shown in Table 2 the specifications include country-specific institu-
tional variables of the DICE Institutions Climate Index separately and jointly. 
The standard neoclassical input factors, ICT and Non-ICT capital deepening, are esti-
mated as highly statistically significant in the specifications without country institutions (col-
umn I, II). Non-ICT shows a stronger positive impact than ICT, while R&D is estimated as 
statistically insignificant (column II). Introducing the composite DICE Institutions Climate 
Index (column III) does not change the estimates for ICT and Non-ICT considerably, but 
turns the positive R&D effect significant. The composite DICE index is also significant, sug-
gesting that the institutions positively influence growth, thereby supporting the institutional 
hypothesis as a fundamental cause for economic growth. 
Dwelling deeper on the single institutional characteristics, I split the composite DICE 
index into its sub-components including each of them into the regressions separately (column 
IV–XI). As a result, most of the institutions appear to be insignificant, except Basic Institu-
tional Quality and Human Capital Efficiency. Both sub-components are estimated as highly 
statistically significant with a positive marginal effect on country labor productivity growth. 
Moreover, the inclusion of both institutions renders R&D significant. The last column, which 
includes all institutional sub-components jointly, reveals that several of the insignificant insti-
tutions in the separate specifications are now estimated as statistically significant. Those are 
Optimal Taxation, Total Tax Revenue, Labor Markets, and Government Expenditures that all 
reduce growth the closer regulation quality moves towards the OECD best-practice country. 
These unexpected latter results may be due to problems of collinearity, as institutions 
are usually correlated among each other. Under such circumstances the estimated coefficients 
may change erratically in response to small changes in the model. However, collinearity does 
not reduce the reliability of the model as a whole, but mainly affects calculations regarding 
individual predictors, i.e. the correlated variables indicate how well the entire bundle of 
covariates predict country labor productivity growth, but they may not provide valid   13
estimates about individual coefficients or about the redundancy of single institutions with 
others. To control for collinearity issues I conduct a robustness check in the subsequent 
section. 
Examining the idiosyncratic industry effects of the LSDV regression in more detail dis-
closes many industries with significantly estimated average labor productivity growth rates 
across countries (see Table A2 in the Appendix). Industries with high average labor produc-
tivity growth rates are Chemicals (including others), Machinery, Office & Electronic Equip-
ment, Automobiles & Other Transport, and Electricity, Gas & Water Supply. Construction 
exhibits significantly negative growth rates on average throughout all specifications. In par-
ticular, Office & Electronic Equipment shows very strong average labor productivity growth 
across countries with about 5% as those sectors managed to reap enormous productivity gains 
from increased ICT investments during the New Economy post 1995. 
The panel unit-root tests for the residuals of the LSDV regressions reject the hypothesis 
of non-stationarity on the highest level of significance for both unit-root tests, all model and 
lag specifications (III–XII) (Table A5, Appendix). These test results affirm not having under-
lying trends in the DGP of the panel missed by the deterministic part of the regression models 
that may violate necessary conditions of the error terms and thus deny reliability of statistical 
inference. 
Rerunning the specifications of Table 2 this time controlling for endogeneity discloses 
significant changes in the estimation results. In Table 3 the system GMM regressions show 
that there is a persistent t-4 lag structure in the dependent variables across all specifications 
including institutions. The table further reveals that ICT capital deepening now turns statisti-
cally insignificant, while Non-ICT is still significant. Only in case of including human capital 
(column VII) is the effect of ICT estimated as weakly significant. These results conjecture 
that productivity gains accrue to those countries that manage to combine increased sectoral 
investments in new technologies with a high human capital endowment. This relationship 
will be analyzed more formally in the following section. However, accounting for endogene-
ity still keeps the overall DICE index significant (column III), while R&D turns insignificant 
throughout. 
Disaggregation into single DICE sub-components now reveals that many more institu-
tions matter compared to the results of Table 2. Those are Optimal Taxation, which nega-
tively impacts a country’s labor productivity growth the closer the taxation institutions move   14
toward the OECD best-practice country.
7 Trade Openness and Capital Markets exhibit statis-
tically significant productivity growth enhancing effects the closer intuitions change towards 
those of the OECD leader. Basic Institutional Quality and Human Capital Efficiency are still 
estimated as significant with a positive impact on growth. The joint inclusion of all institu-
tional variables (column XII) shows the same mixed picture as in specification XII of Table 
2: Labor productivity improvements go along with Basic Institutional Quality, while Optimal 
Taxation, Labor Markets, and Government Expenditures show negative growth effects. 
3.3.2  Robustness Checks 
In the next step I implement robustness checks for the joint specification (column XII in Ta-
ble 2 and 3) by controlling for correlation between covariates and conducting sensitivity 
analyses of results. For testing coefficient estimates without collinearity among the covariates 
a reduced set of variables is employed. This variables set is selected from correlation analysis 
as depicted in Table A3 (Appendix). 
According to Table A3 it becomes obvious that there is a marked correlation between 
Optimal Taxation and various different institutions: strong correlation of more than 70 per-
cent is given for this variable and Total Tax Revenue and Labor Markets, while weaker corre-
lation (around 50 percent) can be found in case of Government Expenditures and Capital 
Markets. But also Human Capital Efficiency and Basic Institutional Quality show strong cor-
relation of above 70 percent. Weaker correlations of around 50 percent can also be stated for 
Government Expenditures and Total Tax Revenue as well as Capital Markets and Labor 
Markets. These correlations may be responsible for some of the non-significances of single 
institutional covariates in the joint specifications, which is why I decide to drop some of 
them. 
As Optimal Taxation is correlated with many variables, I started to excluded it from the 
regressions first. Among the highly correlated variables Basic Institutional Quality and Hu-
man Capital Efficiency, Basic Institutional Quality is dropped since it captures more of an 
overall effect of institutions like the total DICE index. Since Government Expenditures is 
correlated with Total Tax Revenue and both are being estimated as statistically insignificant 
in the separated specifications, I drop these two covariates as well. Since Trade Openness has 
                                                           
7 Outlined in Eicher and Roehn (2007) the Optimal Taxation sub-component captures linear and non-linear 
effects. This makes it hard to meaningfully separate the sub-component’s single factors, which is why a discus-
sion of this sub-component should be provided only as a whole. Whether the non-linearity of the tax effect is 
adequately captured for all countries as well as modeled in the regressions is not yet clear. That is why the ef-
fects of this coefficient should be interpreted with caution.   15
been estimated statistically insignificant in LSDV and only weakly significant at the 10 per-
cent level in system GMM, I also excluded this variable, ending up with a parsimonious 
benchmark specification of three institutional variables: Human Capital Efficiency, Labor 
Markets, and Capital Markets. 
Column I in Table 4 shows the last column of Table 3 for comparison purposes. For the 
parsimonious benchmark specification (column II) it can be stated that the lag structure of the 
dependent variable is still significant on the third and fourth lag. But ICT capital deepening 
now turns weakly significant, while Non-ICT keeps its high statistically significance. All of 
the three institutional variables of interest are estimated as significant and will be discussed in 
greater detail in the following. 
Human Capital Efficiency shows a positive effect on labor productivity growth as insti-
tutions approach the institutional level of the best-practice OECD country. Put differently, the 
more countries reform their human capital institutions towards those of the best-practice 
country the stronger their labor productivity growth will be. For Labor Markets, on the con-
trary, getting closer to the best-practice OECD country coincides with negative labor produc-
tivity growth. This may be due to improvements in labor market regulations in France, Spain, 
and the Netherlands (with low GDP per capita growth) moving toward the OECD best-
practice country in recent years, but that have not yet transformed into better productivity 
growth. Also, Scandinavian countries like Sweden and Finland are far from the liberal labor 
market regulations in Anglo-Saxon countries like the UK and the US, which are usually asso-
ciated with better economic growth. The Capital Markets institutions show productivity 
growth enhancing effects from improving institutions of private sector domestic credit and 
capital markets control towards those of the OECD leader. 
In the following specification III I control for interaction effects between the three insti-
tutional covariates and the R&D stock component to formally test whether productivity 
growth through innovations is supported by specific institutional settings. The estimates dis-
close that R&D positively interacts only with human capital efficiency. This finding supports 
the view of human capital as an important driver for growth (Lucas 1988; Romer, 1990), par-
ticularly, as it facilitates the adoption of technology diffusion (Nelson and Phelps, 1966; 
Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994). In the case of Capital and Labor Markets the R&D interaction 
terms show no significant growth effect.   16
The subsequent specifications further test for robustness of coefficients by introducing 
three other institutional variables, which are ICT Patents (in 1000), Internal Conflict and 
Civil Liberties. The inclusion of alternative covariates serves as a sensitivity analysis of our 
previous results. The first additional covariate is a proxy for a country’s innovation or tech-
nology potential measured by technology patents as provided by the OECD.
8 Its aim is to 
include a differently measured technology indicator unlike ICT capital services and R&D 
stocks. 
The second institutional variable intends to account for a country’s conflicts provided 
by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), which provides ratings comprising 22 vari-
ables in three sub-categories of risk: political, financial, and economic. From the sub-
categories I use Internal Conflict for the robustness check as other ICRG variables are al-
ready implemented in the construction of the DICE Institutions Climate Index. This variable 
ranges from 0 to 12 with lower (higher) values indicating higher (lower) risk and assesses a 
country’s political violence and its actual or potential impact on governance. Highest ratings 
are given to those countries where the government does not indulge in arbitrary violence, 
direct or indirect, against its own people. Lowest ratings are given to those countries involved 
in civil wars.
9 
The last robustness variable is Civil Liberties provided by Freedom House, which pub-
lishes annual reports on the degree of perceived democratic freedoms in each country. The 
Civil Liberties variable ranges from 1 to 7 indicating most (1) to least liberties (7). Countries 
that receive highest ratings come closest to ensuring most possible civil liberties as freedom 
of expression, assembly, association, education, and religion. Countries with lower but still 
high ratings (as e.g. rating of 2) have deficiencies in a few aspects of civil liberties and 
slightly weaker civil liberties than those countries with a rating of 1. Reasons for this may be 
limits on media independence, restrictions on trade union activities, and discrimination 
against minority groups and women.
10 
As depicted in column IV–VI of Table 4 the additional covariates are all estimated sta-
tistically significant and their inclusion does not impact the effects of the institutional vari-
                                                           
8 Further details on ICT Patents can be obtained from the OECD Main Science and Technology Indicators 
available on the internet: http://www.oecd.org/document/26/0,3343,en_2649_34451_1901082_1_1_1_1,00.html 
[accessed February 9, 2010]. 
9 Further details on the Internal Conflict methodology are available on the internet: http://www.prsgroup.com/ 
ICRG_Methodology.aspx [accessed February 9, 2010]. 
10 Further details on the Civil Liberties methodology are available on the internet: 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/ template.cfm?page=351&ana_page=354&year=2009 [accessed February 9, 
2010].   17
ables of interest. Increasing the number of ICT Patents generates higher labor productivity 
growth, but substitutes the effect of ICT capital deepening. Higher index values of Internal 
Conflict reduce labor productivity growth and turn ICT capital deepening statistically signifi-
cant. This negative effect may be explained by high-productivity countries like the US and 
UK but also Sweden, which exhibit declining trends in the ICRG institutions variable post 
2000, whereas low-productivity countries like Italy and Spain managed to improve their in-
ternal conflict ratings in most recent years. Regarding the last robustness variable, higher 
index values of Civil Liberties impact labor productivity growth positively, suggesting coun-
tries with lower but still high civil liberties to perform better in terms productivity growth. 
This may be due to similar reasons as in the case of Internal Conflict, since many countries 
(e.g. Italy, Spain, UK, and France) have improved their civil liberties from rating 2 to 1 in 
recent years, although these specific countries are characterized by low productivity growth. 
Other high-productivity countries (like the US and Finland) exhibit a rating of 1 throughout 
the entire period. 
Including all alternative institutional variables jointly into the regression (column VII) 
leaves the statistical inferences as well as the magnitudes of the institutional variables of in-
terest unaltered. This is also the case for the robustness variables. Moreover, ICT capital 
deepening is estimated as significant in this last specification, supporting the view that new 
technologies embedded in employed investments contribute to country labor productivity 
growth. 
4. Conclusion 
This paper analyzes the effects of institutions and innovations on country productivity 
growth. In my first attempt without controlling for endogeneity, I find that aggregate institu-
tions matter, in particular, basic institutional quality and human capital efficiency. The effect 
of innovations turns significant only when aggregate institutions or basic institutional quality 
and human capital efficiency are included. ICT and Non-ICT capital deepening matters 
throughout all those specifications. On the contrary, when controlling for endogeneity the 
empirical evidence shows that ICT capital deepening loses significance, except when human 
capital efficiency is included. Also, innovations become insignificant throughout all the 
specifications, but more institutional variables turn statistically significant. Besides the two 
institutions basic institutional quality and human capital efficiency, optimal taxation, trade 
openness, and capital markets become important institutions for productivity growth.   18
Controlling for correlation between institutional covariates ends up in a parsimonious 
benchmark model including three institutions: human capital efficiency, labor markets, and 
capital markets, which are all determined to exhibit a significant impact on productivity 
growth. I further find that innovations have a direct effect on country productivity growth and 
that this effect is moderated by a country’s human capital efficiency. Interactions between 
industry innovations and human capital endowment stimulate productivity growth. Allowing 
for three alternative institutional variables does not change the effects of the institutional 
variables of interest. Ultimately, ICT capital deepening becomes significant in the parsimoni-
ous benchmark model as well as in the other robustness check specifications.   19
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Table 1  
Descriptive Statistics of Input and Institutional Variables  
                   
  Variable  Status Mean Std. Dev. Min.  Max.  Obs.
                   
  Labor Productivity   Growth Rates 0.0289 0.0582 -0.2040  0.3155  1677
  ICT Capital Deepening  Growth Rates 0.1001 0.0818 -0.2170  0.5341  1632
  Non-ICT Capital Deepening  Growth Rates 0.0284 0.0432 -0.3851  0.4103  1632
  R&D Stock  Growth Rates 0.0580 0.1262 -0.1541  1.1963  1546
Total Composite Index  Level 0.5974 0.0513 0.4924  0.6965  1800
Optimal Taxation  Level 0.7111 0.1123 0.3550  0.7874  1800
Basic Institutional Quality  Level 0.8033 0.1380 0.4609  0.9952  1800
Total Tax Revenue  Level 0.3028 0.1852 0.0024  0.6827  1800
Human Capital Efficiency  Level 0.5658 0.1160 0.3588  0.8291  1800
Trade Openness  Level 0.7132 0.0722 0.4487  0.8541  1800
Labor Markets  Level 0.4350 0.1987 0.0539  0.7943  1800












Capital Markets  Level 0.5681 0.1372 0.2016  0.8243  1800
ICT Patents (in 1000) 
Level
1.7216 2.5425 0.0281  12.0099  1800













Civil Liberties  Level 1.3933 0.4393 1.0000  2.2000  1800
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Table 4  
Cross-Country Labor Productivity Growth Regressions, 1992–2005 
                     
SYSTEM GMM  I
a)  II  III  IV  V  VI  VII 
                     
  ALPt-1  -0.0472  0.0030 0.0304 0.0145 0.0251  0.0210 0.0045
    [0.0652]  [0.0612] [0.0497] [0.0500] [0.0496]  [0.0499] [0.0503]
  ALPt-2  -0.0058  0.0300 0.0395 0.0221 0.0454  0.0364 0.0256
    [0.0614]  [0.0540] [0.0495] [0.0530] [0.0498]  [0.0502] [0.0538]
 ALPt-3  0.1469** 0.1539*** 0.1167** 0.1133** 0.1202**  0.1153** 0.1112**
    [0.0575] [0.0563] [0.0545] [0.0555] [0.0541] [0.0548] [0.0560]
 ALPt-4  0.0982** 0.0978** 0.1154*** 0.1156*** 0.1209***  0.1231*** 0.1218***
    [0.0440] [0.0464] [0.0400] [0.0399] [0.0398] [0.0400] [0.0399]
 ICT  Capital  Deepening  0.0434  0.0517* 0.0453* 0.0451 0.0591**  0.0421 0.0531*
    [0.0337] [0.0298] [0.0271] [0.0274] [0.0290] [0.0277] [0.0303]
  Non-ICT Capital Deepening  0.2608*** 0.2367*** 0.3018*** 0.3024*** 0.3024*** 0.2974*** 0.3066***
    [0.0874] [0.0750] [0.0750] [0.0792] [0.0774] [0.0798] [0.0828]
 R&D  Stock  0.0096  -0.0068 -0.0831 -0.1334 -0.1165 -0.1067 -0.2000
    [0.0278] [0.0252] [0.1408] [0.1410] [0.1400] [0.1390] [0.1411]
Capital Markets  0.0592  0.0616*** 0.0661*** 0.0435* 0.0692*** 0.0667*** 0.0455**
  [0.0359] [0.0203] [0.0190] [0.0222] [0.0177] [0.0181] [0.0210]
Government Expenditures  -0.0276*   
 [0.0155]   
Labor Markets  -0.0689*** -0.0254* -0.0245* -0.0293** -0.0360** -0.0295** -0.0451***
  [0.0200] [0.0132] [0.0127] [0.0127] [0.0138] [0.0129] [0.0143]
Trade Openness  -0.0189   
 [0.0310]   
Human Capital Efficiency  0.0247  0.0713*** 0.0526*** 0.0481** 0.0726*** 0.1005*** 0.1065***
  [0.0346] [0.0183] [0.0176] [0.0186] [0.0187] [0.0255] [0.0268]
Total Tax Revenue  -0.0189   
 [0.0242]   
Basic Institutional Quality  0.0382*   
  [0.0228]   

























  [0.0500]   
Capital Markets    -0.1520 -0.0652 -0.1974  -0.0894 -0.0229
    [0.2692] [0.2661] [0.2730]  [0.2690] [0.2741]
Labor Markets    -0.0232 -0.0534 -0.0260  -0.0367 -0.0695
    [0.1722] [0.1776] [0.1654]  [0.1708] [0.1728]



















    [0.1985] [0.2061] [0.2018]  [0.1963] [0.2128]
ICT Patents (in 1000)      0.0018*   0.0019**
      [0.0010]   [0.0010]
Internal Conflict        -0.0038**  -0.0036**
        [0.0016]  [0.0016]












          [0.0054] [0.0054]
  Constant  0.0861  -0.0598*** -0.0546*** -0.0394** -0.0223  -0.0993*** -0.0450
    [0.0537]  [0.0142] [0.0130] [0.0152] [0.0192]  [0.0213] [0.0285]
                 
                 
  Observations  1076  1076 1076 1076 1076  1076 1076
  Nr. of countries x sectors  120  120 120 120 120  120 120
  AR1 Test   0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000
  AR2 Test   0.9366  0.9762 0.6802 0.7642 0.5561  0.6354 0.5855
  Nr. of Instruments  250  246 405 409 409  409 409
  Over-Identification  1.0000  1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000  1.0000 1.0000
                     
Notes: a) Specification I resembles specification XII in Table 3. Outliers excluded. Robust standard errors in brackets allowing for 
intra-industry correlation. Significance levels *, **, ***: significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent. Sources: EUKLEMS (2008), OECD 
(2006) and IIGAD (2008).   26
Appendix  
 
Table A1  
Industry Coverage by ISIC Classification 




    
1  Food and Tobacco  D: 15 to 16 
2  Textiles, Apparel, and Leather   D: 17 to 19 
3  Wood Products  D: 20 
4  Paper, Pulp, Publishing, Printing   D: 21 to 22 
5  Coke, Petroleum, Nuclear Fuels  D: 23 
6  Chemicals and others
a)  D: 24 to 26 
7  Basic and Fabricated Metals  D: 27 to 28 
8 Machinery  D:  29 
9  Office Machinery and Electronic Equipment  D: 30 to 33 
10  Automobiles and Other Transport  D: 34 to 35 
11 Manufacturing  n.e.c.
b)  D: 36 to 37 
12  Electricity, Gas & Water Supply  E: 40 to 41 
13 Construction  F:  45 
       
Notes: a) others comprise the sectors Rubber and Plastic, and Non-Metallic 
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Table A3 
Correlation Coefficients for Covariates (1992–2005) 

















































































































































































































































              
Labor Productivity*  1.00             
ICT Capital Deepening*  0.11  1.00            
Non-ICT Capital Deepening*  0.25  0.24  1.00           
R&D Stock*  0.04  0.05  0.01  1.00          
Optimal Taxation  -0.05  -0.20  0.04  0.09  1.00         
Basic Institutional Quality  0.12  0.07  0.01  -0.17  -0.20  1.00        
Total Tax Revenue  -0.05  0.16  -0.06  0.00  -0.75  -0.14  1.00       
Human Capital Efficiency  0.13  0.06  0.00  -0.10  -0.36  0.73  -0.18  1.00      
Trade  Openness  -0.01 0.00  -0.03 -0.12 0.04  0.25  -0.17 0.14  1.00     
Labor  Markets  0.04 0.16 0.01 -0.09  -0.77  0.26 0.46 0.44 -0.02  1.00    
Government  Expenditures  -0.03 0.25  -0.06 -0.01 -0.52  0.15  0.56  0.00 0.11 0.16 1.00   
Capital  Markets  0.03 0.12 0.03 -0.15  -0.50  0.37 0.43 0.17 0.43 0.50  0.39  1.00 
              
Note: * indicates variables in growth rates, while others are in levels. Outliers excluded. Sources: EUKLEMS (2008), OECD 
(2006) and IIGAD (2008). 
Table A4 
Panel Unit-Root Tests of Output and Input Variables (1992–2005) 
                     
LLC   IPS   ADF  PP 
                      
Labor Productivity                   
                   
Lag (0)  0.0000  Lag (0) 0.0000  Lag (0)  0.0000  Lag (0) 0.0000 
Lag (1)  0.0000  Lag (1) 0.0000  Lag (1)  0.0000  Lag (1) 0.0000 
                    
ICT Capital Deepening                 
                   
Lag (0)  ---  Lag (0)  ---  Lag (0)  0.0000  Lag (0) 0.0000 
Lag (1)  ---  Lag (1)  ---  Lag (1)  0.0000  Lag (1) 0.0000 
                   
Non-ICT Capital Deepening                 
                   
Lag (0)  ---  Lag (0)  ---  Lag (0)  0.0000  Lag (0) 0.0000 
Lag (1)  ---  Lag (1)  ---  Lag (1)  0.0000  Lag (1) 0.0000 
                    
R&D Stocks                     
                   
Lag (0)  ---  Lag (0)  ---  Lag (0)  0.0000  Lag (0) 0.0000 
Lag (1)  ---  Lag (1)  ---  Lag (1)  0.0000  Lag (1) 0.0000 
                     
Notes: All variables are in exponential growth rates. Unit-root tests are performed without trends including 
constants. LLC and IPS are only performed for balanced panels. An outlier industry as treated in the re-
gressions excluded. Sources: EUKLEMS (2008), OECD (2006) and IIGAD (2008).   29
Table A5 
Panel Unit-Root Tests of Regression Residuals of Table 2 (1992–2005) 
        
ADF PP 
        
Specification III    Specification III 
 
         
Lag (0)  0.0000  Lag (0)  0.0000 
Lag (1)  0.0000  Lag (1)  0.0000 
         
 
Specification  IV  
 
Specification  IV 
 
       
Lag (0)  0.0000  Lag (0)  0.0000 
Lag (1)  0.0000  Lag (1)  0.0000 
         
 




       
Lag (0)  0.0000  Lag (0)  0.0000 
Lag (1)  0.0000  Lag (1)  0.0000 
         
 




         
Lag (0)  0.0000  Lag (0)  0.0000 
Lag (1)  0.0000  Lag (1)  0.0000 
         
 
Specification  VII  
 
Specification  VII 
 
         
Lag (0)  0.0000  Lag (0)  0.0000 
Lag (1)  0.0000  Lag (1)  0.0000 
         
 




         
Lag (0)  0.0000  Lag (0)  0.0000 
Lag (1)  0.0000  Lag (1)  0.0000 
         
 
Specification  IX  
 
Specification  IX 
 
         
Lag (0)  0.0000  Lag (0)  0.0000 
Lag (1)  0.0000  Lag (1)  0.0000 
         
 




         
Lag (0)  0.0000  Lag (0)  0.0000 
Lag (1)  0.0000  Lag (1)  0.0000 
         
 




         
Lag (0)  0.0000  Lag (0)  0.0000 
Lag (1)  0.0000  Lag (1)  0.0000 
         
 




         
Lag (0)  0.0000  Lag (0)  0.0000 
Lag (1)  0.0000  Lag (1)  0.0000 
        
Notes: Residuals are in exponential growth rates. Unit-root tests are performed 
without trends including constants.     
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